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Notes
ABROGATION OF PLAINTIFF'S DUE CARE
REQUIREMENT IN PRIVATE ACTIONS
UNDER RULE 10b-5
Some courts seem to have required a private plaintiff to show that he acted
with due care before allowing recovery under rule lOb-5. The author examines
this supposed due care requirement and finds it to be analogous to the
contributory negligence doctrine. Since the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder restricted private recovery under rule lOb-5 to situations in
which the defendant acted with scienter, the author concludes that recent
cases have appropriately rejected the due care requirement.
RULE lOb-51 WAS PROMULGATED under the authority of sec-
tion 10(b), the general antifraud provision of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. Clauses (a) and (c) of the rule broadly prohibit
any party from engaging in any activity which is a fraud or operates as
a fraud, while clause (b) specifically- prohibits half-truths and misstate-
ments of material fact.2 However, in some instances, plaintiffs have
been precluded from recovery under rule lOb-5 because they failed to
seek out and analyze material information about a securities transac-
tion in a prudent manner.3 The standard against which the adequacy of
1. Rule lOb-5 as promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act], by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate [sic] commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
2. Arguably, complete omissions are not prohibited under the language of rule
lob-5. Clause (b) prohibits half-truths and misstatements only. Thus complete omissions
could only be reached by the broad language found in clauses (a) or (c). For purposes of
this Note it will be assumed that complete omissions are actionable under rule lOb-5.
3. The leading article advancing the view that a plaintiff must meet a standard of
due care in order to recover in a private action for damages or rescission under rule
lOb-5 even though the defendant has committed an intentional fraud is Wheeler, Plain-
tiff's Duty of Due Care Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Defense to An Implied Remedy, 70
Nw. U.L. REV. 561 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wheeler]. See also Note, The Due
Diligence Requirement for Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DuKE L.J. 753. Contra,
Campbell, Elements of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Reliance, and Plaintiff's
Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S.C.L. REV. 653,668-69 (1975); Cobine, Elements
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the plaintiff's conduct was judged was one of simple negligence. 4
Imposing a due care requirement upon the plaintiff appeared to be a
tenable judicial approach to restrict litigation under rule lOb-5 when
the defendant had negligently violated the securities laws. However, in
light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfel-
der,5 which limits private recovery under rule 1Ob-5 to cases in which
the defendant acted with scienter, 6 the propriety of the due care
requirement must be reconsidered. Indeed, recent judicial devel-
opments indicate a relaxation of the due care requirement; the victim
of a fraudulent securities transaction need no longer establish that he
investigated the offender's misconduct in order to recover in a private
action under rule lOb-5.7 This Note examines the policy behind, and
purposes underlying, the establishment of the implied private right of
action under rule 1 Ob-5 in conjunction with the case law discussing the
due care requirement. In addition, the Note evaluates the propriety of
allowing a defendant who has intentionally violated the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws to escape liability simply
because his victim has failed to exercise due care.
I. LIMITATIONS ON PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER RULE lOb-5
For the past three decades federal courts have implied the existence
of private rights of action for violations of rule l0b-5.8 The implied
of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule lob-5 Actions, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 651, 667;
Note, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U. CH. L. REV. 824 (1965).
Since the due care requirement is also closely related to reliance and causation, see also
Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SECRule lOb-5, 88 HARv. L.
REV. 854 (1974); Note, The Nature and Scope of the Reliance Requirement in Private
Actions Under SEC Rule lob-5, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 363 (1973); Comment,
Reliance Under Rule lob-5: Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L.
REV. 562 (1972).
4. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1017 (5th Cir. 1977); Clement A. Evans &
Co. v. McAlpine, 424 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971);
City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221,230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970).
5. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
6. In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court defined scienter as intent to deceive and left
open the question whether reckless behavior could constitute scienter. Id. at 194 n. 12.
See note 49 infra.
7. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955(1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976);
McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
8. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). In 1971,
the Supreme Court, in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 4
(1971), recognized the implied private right of action under rule lOb-5. The Supreme
Court recently confirmed the private remedy in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder:
Although § 10(b) does not by its terms create an express civil remedy for its
violation, and there is no indication that Congress, or the Commission when
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private right of action is justified by the general principle of tort law
that violation of a legislative enactment or administrative regulation
designed to prevent a particular type of harm can give rise to a civil
remedy. 9 Of the five general federal antifraud provisions available to a
person injured in a securities transaction,' 0 rule 10b-5 produces the
greatest amount of litigation." The popularity of rule 10b-5 is due to
two major factors: the scope of rule 10b-5 is broader than the other
antifraud provisions, 12 and the development of the rule has been
adopting Rule lOb-5, contemplated such a remedy, the existence of a private
cause of action for violations of the statute is now well established.
425 U.S. at 196. Accord, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972).
9. As the Fifth Circuit pointed out in Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.
1970), "a person injured by a violation of a statute enacted for the benefit of persons in
his position may bring his own [rule lOb-5] action seeking redress for the harm caused
him." Id. at 804. Accord, Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14
(E.D. Pa. 1946). The SEC can sue to enjoin violations of § 10(b) and rule lob-5 and can
also invoke criminal remedies. Exchange Act §§ 21, 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78u, 78ff (1970). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1965); 1 A. BROMBERG,
SECURiTsS LAW: FRAu--SEC RULE lOb-5, § 2.4(l)(a) (1977).
There is another major rationale for allowing implied private rights of action under
rule lOb-5. Implied private rights of action serve not only to compensate injured parties
for losses suffered in a securities transaction, they also provide necessary supplemental
enforcement of the securities laws. This supplementary enforcement rationale was
adopted in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975), (citing
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)). See section VI infra.
10. In addition to § 10(b), Congress has enacted four other general antifraud provi-
sions: Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11(a), 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77k, 77! (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Securities Act], and rule 15c 1-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c 1-2 (1977)
promulgated pursuant to the Exchange Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970).
11. As the Supreme Court noted in SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969):
"§10(b) and Rule lOb-5 may well be the most litigated provisions in the federal securities
laws." Id. at 465. Professor Bromberg has observed that "10b-5 is generating almost as
much litigation as all the other general antifraud provisions together, and several times as
much as the expressed liabilities." 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 9, at § 2.5(6).
12. There are several reasons a plaintiff may choose to bring an action under rule
lOb-5 rather than the other antifraud provisions of the securities laws. Most importantly,
the statute of limitations is determined by state law and may run longer than the one year
statute of limitations applicable under §§ 11 and 12 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77k, 771, and 77m (1970). Second, only the purchaser of a security can bring an action
under H l1(a), 12(2), and 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, and 77q
(1970). Rule lOb-5 may be utilized by a buyer or seller of a security. Third, not every
antifraud provision covers omissions. Sections 11 (a) and 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. §9 77k, 771 (1970) and clause (b) of rule lOb-5 embrace material untruths or half-
truths. Section 11 (a) also covers complete omissions and rule lOb-5 covers pure nondis-
closure where there is a duty to disclose. Rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240, 15cl-2 (1977),
and clause (c) of rule lOb-5 also encompass acts, practices, or courses of business which
operate or would tend to operate as a fraud or deceit. Only clause (a) of rule lOb-5 and §
17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970), reach devices, schemes, and artifices
to defraud. Section 17(a) is probably closest to rule lOb-5 in the breadth of its coverage,
but its use is limited because not all courts recognize an implied private right of action
19781
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fostered by expansive and flexible judicial interpretation. 13
Since rule 1Ob-5 has become the catchall provision of the federal
securities laws, some authorities have expressed concern that
continued indiscriminate extension of the rule may transform it into an
insurance policy for foolish investors." The drafters of the Exchange
Act were aware of the far-reaching potential of its antifraud provisions.
They provided that "the rights and remedies provided by this title shall
be in addition to any and all other rights, and remedies that may exist at
law or in equity .... "11 Courts have followed this mandate against
foreclosing common law remedies, but they have sought to limit the
potentially over-broad reach of rule lOb-5 by subjecting lOb-5 plain-
tiffs to traditional common law defenses16 including waiver, estoppel,
laches, 17 and in pari delicto. 18 Nevertheless, in enacting section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act, Congress did not foresee private actions under
the antifraud rules promulgated under that section and there are few
congressional guidelines defining the perimeters of a private right of
action under rule lOb-5.19 At times the courts have paid close attention
to the specific language of the rule to narrow its impact. For example,
in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores20 the Supreme Court held
under § 17(a). Although § 11(a) covers pure omissions, § 11 liability is limited to
misrepresentations in the registration statements covering the purchased securities. Rule
15cl-2 is similarly limited to misrepresentations by brokers or dealers. See I A. BROM-
BERG, supra note 9, at § 2.5(4).
13. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), where
the Supreme Court noted that: "[S]ection 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and
restrictively." Id. at 12. See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
151 (1972); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
14. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); Wheeler, supra note 3, at 588; Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions
Under SEC Rule lOb-S, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 606 (1975).
15. Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
16. For a general discussion of common law defenses to private rule lOb-5 actions,
see Bell, How to Bar an Uninnocent Investor-the Validity of Common Law Defenses to
Private Actions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1970).
17. Royal Air Prop., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962). Waiver is the
intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known legal right. Estoppel arises when one
is precluded from asserting a right because of previous actions which were inconsistent
with that right. Laches occurs when the plaintiff fails to prosecute his claim within a
reasonable period. See Note, Applicability of Waiver, Estoppel, and Laches Defenses to
Private Suits Under the Securities Act and S.E.C. Rule lOb-S: Deterrence and Equity in
Balance, 73 YALE L.J. 1477 n.7 (1964).
18. The in pari delicto defense may be raised by the defendant when the plaintiff has
also violated rule lOb-5. See Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975);
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969). Contra, Nathanson v. Weis,
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
19. Courts have relied on the express liability sections of the securities laws to
describe the scope of the implied private right of action under rule lOb-5. See section III
B infra.
20. 421 U.S. 723 (1974).
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that the "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"
requirement of rule lOb-5 limited the class of potential plaintiffs to
those who were either purchasers or sellers of a security. More fre-
quently, because the language of rule lOb-5 is not specific, the courts
are forced to develop their own standards for private recovery under
the rule. 21
These standards generally take the form of specific elements which
a plaintiff must plead and prove. 22 In order to invoke the private
remedy of rule lOb-5 the plaintiff must first establish the materiality of
the information which was not properly disclosed.23 The Supreme
Court has held: "An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
[making his decision]. '"24 The test of materiality is, therefore, an
objective one.25 In some situations this results in an affirmative obliga-
tion to disclose information which a reasonable and prudent person
might consider pertinent to an investment choice. 26 Conversely, the
materiality element precludes recovery where the plaintiff could not
reasonably contend that the misrepresentation, half-truth, or omission
played or would have played an important role in his investment
decision.
Once the plaintiff has established that the defendant has misrepre-
sented material information, he must demonstrate actual (subjective)
reliance. 27 As stated by one court, the purpose underlying proof of
21. The Supreme Court pointed out in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1974), that: "[W]e are dealing with a private cause of action which has been
judicially found to exist, and which will have to be judicially delimited one way or
another unless and until Congress addresses the question." Id. at 749.
22. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir. 1977).
23. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971);
Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
24. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
25. Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 584 (3d Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 408 (3d Cir. 1973); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th
Cir. 1963).
26. See Rochez Bros., Inc. where the court explained: "Materiality. . .provides
the basis for defendant's duty to disclose ...." 491 F.2d at 410.
27. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965).
There is a parallel between reliance and materiality. Reliance is a question of whether
the individual plaintiff acted upon the fact misrepresented. Materiality requires that a
reasonable man would have attached importance to the fact. 340 F.2d at 462-63. Some
courts have merged the two elements and measured the plaintiff's conduct against that of
a reasonable man with the attributes of the plaintiff. See Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial
Dynamics Fund, 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d
1978]
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reliance is "to certify that the conduct of the defendant actually caused
the plaintiff's injury." 28 Not only must the plaintiff prove actual
reliance, but he must also establish that his reliance was justifiable
under the circumstances. 29 A court may properly conclude that the
plaintiff caused his own injury where his conduct is shown to be utterly
unreasonable, or reckless in light of the circumstances surrounding the
transaction. In these cases the court will consider evidence such as the
plaintiff's business acumen,30 his access to information 31 and his
familiarity with the affairs of the corporation3 2 to determine whether
the plaintiff acted in a reckless manner. In extreme cases, where the
plaintiff had no right to rely, recovery will be denied. For example,
there can be no justifiable reliance on information which is patently
false.33
Both actual and justifiable (objective) reliance are necessary ele-
ments of a lOb-5 claim based on misrepresentation, but the Supreme
Court has indicated that proof of reliance is not a prerequisite for
recovery where the defendant has failed to disclose material facts.3 1
221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) (both cases suggest that the plaintiff must
demonstrate objective reasonable reliance on the defendant's negligent omissions in
order to recover). See also notes 120-27 infra and accompanying text. A reasonable
reliance standard is properly utilized in cases where both parties have acted negligently.
However, this contributory negligence has no validity where the defendant has commit-
ted an intentional violation of rule lOb-5.
28. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787,797 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). Accord, Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 496 F.2d 832, 836
n.12 (3rd Cir. 1974); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965).
29. See, e.g., Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 696 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 955 (1977); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
30. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 373-74
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Colvin v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 477 F.2d
1283, 1287-88 (5th Cir. 1973); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100
103-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d
260, 267 (1st Cir. 1966).
31. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 314, 374 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Colvin v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 477 F.2d
1283, 1287-88 (5th Cir. 1973); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104
(5th Cir. 1970); cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); Hafner v. Forest Labs., Inc., 345 F.2d
167, 168 (2d Cir. 1965).
32. Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 496 F.2d 832, 838 (3d Cir. 1974); Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1963).
33. See note 86 infra.
34. See Affiliated Ute Citizens, where the Court determined:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose,
positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary
is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered them important in the making of his decision.
406 U.S. at 153-54.
[Vol. 28:399
PLAINTIFF'S DUE CARE
Requiring a plaintiff to show reliance on an omission poses serious
conceptual problems. Although concealing the information may have
affected the plaintiff's investment decision, the plaintiff could not
argue that he relied upon the omission because the information was
unknown at the time of the transaction. To eliminate this difficulty,
courts have created the concept of presumed or constructive reliance,
an objective standard, in omission cases. Once materiality of the
omitted fact is demonstrated, and constructive reliance is established,
the burden of disproving the plaintiff's actual or subjective reliance
shifts to the defendant. 35
In addition to the elements which the plaintiff must plead and
prove, or which the court presumes-materiality, reliance, and justifi-
able reliance-many courts have suggested that the plaintiff must also
exercise due care in order to recover under rule 1Ob-5. 36 The standard
against which the plaintiff's due care has been measured is one of
simple negligence. 37 Therefore, in cases where both parties acted
negligently, the plaintiff may be precluded from recovery because he
failed to conduct an investigation which would have revealed the
defendant's misrepresentation.3 8
Some courts have purportedly adopted the due care requirement,
yet do not require the plaintiff to exercise the care of a reasonable man
in all circumstances. 39 For example, a plaintiff who actually relied on a
misrepresentation has recovered, notwithstanding his failure to investi-
gate, where the deception was caused by one who owed a fiduciary
obligation to him. In this situation, justifiable reliance on a trust
relationship cuts off the plaintiff's individual obligation to exercise due
care.4° Once justifiable reliance is proven, where a fiduciary relation-
ship is involved, there is no need to establish due care. Since justifiable
reliance is terminated only upon a showing that the plaintiff acted
recklessly, presumably the plaintiff may be negligent and still justifi-
ably rely on the defendant's statements. Therefore, where the plaintiff
35. Carra v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975); Chelsea Ass'n v. Rapanos,
527 F.2d 1266, 1272 (6th Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402,410 (3d
Cir. 1973). See Note, The Reliance Requirement Under Rule lOb-5, 88 H~Av. L. REV.
584 (1975).
36. See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977); Holdsworth v. Strong,
545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman &
Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir.
1967).
37. See note 4 supra.
38. See note 27 supra.
39. See note 36 supra.
40. Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 696-97 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 955 (1977).
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has shown justifiable reliance his claim should not falter on the ele-
ment of due care which looks only to simple negligence.
The due care requirement has not been universally accepted by the
courts. 41 Moreover, some of the decisions which purport to impose a
duty of due care did so only in situations where the information the
plaintiff lacked was not material to the transaction. 42 The analysis of
the plaintiff's conduct in these cases is curious in light of the fact that
those courts found no violation of rule lOb-5. 43 Other courts have
required the plaintiff to prove due care only where the defendant's
misstatement was negligently made. 4 The due care requirement can
then be defended as a doctrine of contributory negligence counter-
balancing the low burden on the plaintiff to show only the defendant's
negligence. However, the vitality of the due care requirement is now in
doubt because the private plaintiff must show the defendant acted with
scienter to recover under rule lOb-5.45
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,46 customers of a brokerage firm
were induced by its president to invest funds in escrow accounts that he
represented to be profitable investments. In reality, no escrow ac-
counts were ever established, and the president converted the funds to
his personal use. The customers brought an action against the account-
ing firm of Ernst & Ernst, alleging that it "had failed to utilize
41. See, e.g., Colvin v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 477 F.2d 1283, 1287, 1289(5th Cir.
1973) (contributory negligence of plaintiff does not bar action per se); Carroll v. First
Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353, 358 (7th Cir. 1969) (contributory negligence not an issue at
pleading stage, "whatever [its] relevance" at trial); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736
(8th Cir. 1967).
42. See, e.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d
514 (10th Cir. 1973).
43. See notes 115-19 infra and accompanying text.
44. See Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir.
1975) (dicta); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 905 (1970).
45. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Before the Supreme Court
decided Hochfelder, federal courts disagreed about the proper standard of culpability to
apply when determining a defendant's liability. In general, they agreed that innocent
statements or omissions were not covered by rule lOb-5. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495
F.2d 724, 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
Contra, Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747-48 (8th Cir. 1967). There was also unanimity
among the courts that knowing or reckless conduct was actionable. See, e.g., Mariash v.
Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973). Opinions differed about whether a plaintiff could
sustain a successful rule lb-5 action against a defendant guilty of mere negligent
conduct. See, e.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d at
517; City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221,229-30 & n.9 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 905 (1970). Contra, Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d at 1145 n.13; SEC v. Coffey,
493 F.2d at 1314, 1316 n.30. See A. JAcoBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 § 63 (1977).
46. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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'appropriate auditing procedures' in its audits" of the brokerage firm's
books and records, thereby aiding and abetting the fraudulent escrow
scheme.47 The customers did not allege fraud or intentional miscon-
duct but based their claim on a negligence theory. Concluding that the
allegation of negligent conduct did not state an implied, private cause
of action under rule lOb-5, the Supreme Court explained: "The words
'manipulative or deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contri-
vance' strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing
or intentional misconduct."' 48 Thus, "§ 10(b) was addressed to prac-
tices that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to
impose liability for negligent conduct alone." 49 Keeping in mind that
the underlying rationale of the Exchange Act is to protect investors
from fraud in the securities markets, 50 and in light of the Hochfelder
decision restricting private recovery under rule 10b-5 to schemes in
which the defendant acted with scienter, the requirement that the
victim of deceptive conduct exercise due care in detecting the offend-
er's fraud has been rendered indefensible, a proposition demonstrated
in the following section.
II. PLAINTIFF'S DUE CARE REQUIREMENT AFTER HOCH-ELDER
Since Hochfelder was decided, a number of courts have
reevaluated the due care requirement. In Straub v. Vaisman,51 mem-
bers of the plaintiff class purchased stock through the defendant bro-
kerage firm, and less than a month after the purchase the corporation
filed a Chapter XI bankruptcy. On several prior occasions Straub had
purchased securities through the firm on the recommendations of its
agent. The plaintiffs sued for rescission under rule lOb-5 alleging,
inter alia, that as financial adviser to the insolvent corporation the
brokerage firm had inside information about the imminent bankruptcy.
47. Id. at 190.
48. Id. at 197.
49. Id. at 201. In a footnote the Court refrained from deciding whether proof of
recklessness would establish scienter.
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is
considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability
for some act. We need not address here the question whether, in some circum-
stances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.
Id. at 194 n.12.
50. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1227
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d
795, 800 (2d Cir. 1973); Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673, 675 (6th Cir. 1970); Berko v. SEC,
316 F.2d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1963); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th
Cir. 1970); Associated See. Corp. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 738, 740 (10th Cir. 1961).
51. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
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The district court found that this nondisclosure of material information
constituted an intentional violation of rule lOb-5.52 On appeal the firm
contended that the plaintiff class should have lost because their repre-
sentative, a sophisticated investor, 53 failed to exercise due care prior to
the purchase. (Apparently he had neither investigated the financial
status of the corporation nor demanded a prospectus.) Such inquiry,
the defendant argued, would have disclosed the stock's true value.
The Third Circuit recognized the plaintiff's lack of due care as an
affirmative defense. However, the standard imposed was a flexible
one, requiring only that the "plaintiff act reasonably." 54 The court
reasoned that the standard must be set in light of such factors as
"fiduciary relationship, opportunity to detect the fraud, sophistication
of the plaintiff, the existence of longstanding business or personal
relationships, and access to the relevant information." 55 Applying this
test to the facts, the court concluded that a sophisticated investor such
as the plaintiff might reasonably rely upon the honesty of the firm since
"[i]ntegrity is still the mainstay of commerce and makes it possible for
an almost limitless number of transactions to take place without resort
to the courts.' 56 The Third Circuit hedged in its decision. It was wary
of the defendant's attempt to escape liability despite the intentional
scheme to defraud, yet it was cognizant that the due care requirement
was accepted among courts and commentators as a means of encourag-
ing investor caution. 57 Therefore, the court chose a flexible, case by
case approach to intentional fraud situations.
52. Id. at 594. The district court also found that the brokerage firm's president and
sole shareholder held a controlling interest in the investment company whose shares
were purchased; that the president was an officer and consultant of the investment
company; that the defendant firm was a market maker in the insolvent investment
company's shares; and that the market price at the time of sale was less than the price the
plaintiff had paid. Id.
53. Straub was the managing director of a portfolio management firm which handled
discretionary securities accounts. Id.
54. Id. at 598.
55. Id.
56. Id. The court also found that since the plaintiff did not have access to informa-
tion concerning the corporation's plan to declare bankruptcy and the transaction took
place during the Christmas holiday season, which afforded little opportunity for investi-
gation, lack of due care was not established. Id.
57. For the proposition that a plaintiff must exercise due care the court cited Rochez
Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1973) (insider-
plaintiff could not fail in his duty of due care where he lacked access to pertinent
corporate records). See also Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971) (see notes 137-41 infra and accompanying
text); Note, The Due Diligence Requirement for Plaintiffs Under Rule lOb-5, 1975 DUKE
L.J. 753 (1975); Note, The Reliance Requirement Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 584 (1975).
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The fundamental problem with this flexible approach to the due
care requirement is contained within its definition. The duty of care
increases in direct proportion to the level of the individual investor's
business sophistication. By varying the standard according to factors
such as the plaintiff's business acumen or access to material informa-
tion, the court is, in effect, encouraging potential violators to vary their
disclosure depending on the relative knowledge and sophistication of
their victims. This approach conflicts with one of the purposes under-
lying rule lOb-5-that every investor should have equal access to
financial information.58 Moreover, if the standard of disclosure varies
according to the attributes of the particular investor, the SEC enforce-
ment mechanisms based on structured disclosure would break down
because there would no longer be a single standard by which to
measure statutory compliance.
Despite the retention of the due care requirement in Straub, it
would be a rare occasion when a defendant who intentionally misrepre-
sented or failed to disclose material information would escape liability
under this flexible due care standard. Recovery would certainly
be granted where there was a fiduciary relationship between the par-
ties, as there is in the vast majority of securities transactions,59 because
reliance on a relationship of trust is reasonable. Only in those few
cases where the plaintiffs are corporate insiders or where the plaintiffs
have had complete access to information in an arm's length transac-
tion, could lack of due care be urged successfully. The court in Straub
also made the plaintiff's case easier by placing the burden on the
defendant to establish the plaintiff's negligence. For this reason, it can
be argued that the due care requirement emerged from Straub as only a
shadow of its former self.
In the Tenth Circuit decision, Holdsworth v. Strong,6° what re-
mained of the due care requirement disappeared. In Holdsworth, the
plaintiff and defendant, who were close friends, formed a corporation
with a third party, issuing an equal number of shares to the parties and
their wives. While it was contemplated that everyone would participate
in the management of the corporation, the defendant soon assumed
complete control. The corporation was eventually reorganized and the
defendant became the majority shareholder. Several years later, the
58. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., where the court stated: "Rule [10b-5] is based in
policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors
trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information
.. 401 F.2d at 848.
59. For a discussion of the fiduciary relationship in rule lOb-5 private actions, see
notes 96-105 infra and accompanying text.
60. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
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defendant notified the plaintiff husband that the corporation had in-
vaded its capital when the last dividends were issued and that no future
dividends would be paid. In the same communication the defendant
offered to purchase the plaintiffs' interest in the corporation. In an
action for rescission, it was established that the defendant induced the
plaintiffs to sell their securities to him on the basis of intentional
misrepresentations and omissions. The defendant had misstated the
stock's value at the time of the transaction 61 and had failed to disclose
to the plaintiffs that he had diverted surplus funds from the corporation
to himself and other members of his family. The defendant argued that
the plaintiff husband, who was an officer and director of the corpora-
tion and an attorney and accountant as well, had failed to exercise due
care in selling his shares.
Initially, the Tenth Circuit noted that, while it may be reasonable to
hold the plaintiff to a due care standard in situations where the defend-
ant would be subject to liability for negligent conduct, no rational
purpose was served by imposing such a burden on the plaintiff where
intentional fraud had been established.62 The court then reassessed the
due care requirement in light of Hochfelder. The court reasoned that if
the plaintiff must prove intentional misconduct on the part of the
defendant and the defendant were permitted to defend on the basis of
the plaintiff's negligence, then the private rule IOb-5 remedy would be
severely limited. To prevent such a result, the court analogized to -the
common law action of deceit and resolved that the plaintiff is not
obligated to inquire into the validity of an intentional misrepresenta-
tion, except in rare circumstances. Later in the oginion the court
attempted to define those rare circumstances, stating, "a plaintiff may
not reasonably or justifiably rely on a misrepresentation where its
falsity is palpable.' '63 At the same time the court opted to retain the
due care requirement, concluding, "[i]f contributory fault of plaintiff
is to cancel out wanton or intentional fraud, it ought to be gross
conduct somewhat comparable to that of defendant.' 64
Under this approach due care could be used to preclude recovery
61. The defendant indicated the corporation was unable to pay dividends, but the
evidence indicated that the corporation actually had a gross income exceeding $100,000
in the year of the misstatement. Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 690 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
62. Analyzing the negligence-intent standard distinction, the court stated:
The circuits which have imposed the due diligence requirement have done so in
the context of the application to the defendant of a negligence standard . ..
[however] where liability requires proof of intentional misconduct, the exaction
of a due diligence standard from the plaintiff becomes irrational and unrelated.
545 F.2d at 692.
63. Id. at 694.
64. Id. at 693.
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only in cases where the plaintiff acted recklessly, in total disregard of
an obvious falsity. However, the standard by which due care is meas-
ured is negligence. Justifiable reliance is the element which is defeated
in extreme cases such as those involving a patent falsity. It is the
plaintiff's failure to prove that the defendant actually caused harm to
the plaintiff which bars recovery in the rare case, and not the failure to
exercise due care. A reckless plaintiff who fails to open his eyes to the
obvious will be precluded from relief regardless of whether he under-
took an investigation.
The Holdsworth court concluded that the plaintiff had proven that
his reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations was justifiable under
the circumstances. Although the plaintiff was a sophisticated investor
as well as a corporate insider, it was reasonable for him to rely on the
defendant's statements because the friendship between the parties was
so close as to be "quasi fiduciary." 65 Once the plaintiff has proven
actual reliance and that his reliance was not utterly unreasonable under
the circumstances, he will recover even though he negligently failed to
undertake reasonable precautions for his own protection.
While the Tenth Circuit in Holdsworth did not expressly abrogate
the due care requirement, it accomplished the same result through
implication. The court conceded that the due care requirement may be
imposed where the plaintiff is grossly negligent in failing to recognize
a patently false misrepresentation. This scenario, however, should be
analyzed as a failure on the part of the plaintiff to establish justifiable
reliance, rather than a failure to exercise due care. Once the plaintiff
has established justifiable and actual reliance on a material misrepre-
sentation, the plaintiff is under no duty of inquiry. It follows, then, that
in a material omission case where reliance is presumed, due care
should not be a required element. The Holdsworth decision has, in
effect, eliminated the due care requirement for cases in which a
defendant has intentionally defrauded his victim.
In Dupuy v. Dupuy,66 a case decided after Holdsworth, the Fifth
Circuit had an opportunity to reevaluate the due care requirement in a
suit involving omissions as well as misrepresentations. The court
found that the plaintiff's brother, who was his business partner, had
intentionally induced the plaintiff to sell his stock in a closely held land
development corporation without disclosing that the corporation had
recently entered into a financing agreement with an outsider. The
financing significantly increased the value of the venture property. The
brother also understated the property's worth. The defendant argued
65. Id. at 696-97.
66. 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977).
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that his brother had failed to exercise due care: as an insider he could
have made an independent investigation of the shares' value and
verified the defendant's statement. Finding no distinction between
misrepresentations and omissions, the court purported to adopt a due
care requirement-separate from the elements of materiality and re-
liance. First the court noted that general principles of tort law disallow
the contributory negligence defense where the defendant's fraud was
intentional. Second, investor protection-the basic objective of the
federal securities laws-is thwarted if the plaintiff's burden of care is
greater than that on the defendant. Accordingly, the court rejected a
negligence standard which would have gauged the plaintiff's conduct
against that of a reasonable and prudent person with the plaintiff's
characteristics, and opted for a recklessness standard, stating: "The
Court should ask whether [plaintiff] intentionally refused to investigate
in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken
to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that
harm would follow." 67 The court found that the plaintiff did not know
that the corporation would be receiving new financing.
By equating lack of due care with intentional or reckless disregard
of a known risk or an obvious falsity, the Dupuy court makes the same
mistake as the Holdsworth court: the minimum measure of due care is
negligence not recklessness. Finding that the plaintiff acted in a reck-
less manner would bar recovery because his reliance was unjustifiable.
The additional question, whether the reckless plaintiff searched for the
omitted information, need not be addressed. Therefore, the court could
not have established an affirmative due care requirement in Dupuy.
In McLean v. Alexander,68 a case decided after Straub but before
the Holdsworth opinion was reported, the Delaware District Court
determined whether reckless misrepresentations by a defendant could
be redressed by a private action under rule lOb-5, a problem left open
by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder. In McLean, a highly sophis-
ticated investor was induced to purchase stock in a closely held
corporation for an inflated price partially on the basis of misrepresenta-
tions concerning the marketability of the company's product and the
opinion of an accountant who reported that certain accounts receivable
were "considered fully collectible.' '69 The court first determined that
reckless preparation of the audit by the accountant was within the
scope of the Hochfelder scienter standard.70 The court's approach to
the due care requirement was similar to the flexible case by case
67. Id. at 1020.
68. 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
69. Id. at 1077.
70. Id. at 1080-84.
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method employed by the Third Circuit in Straub.71 The plaintiff's duty
to scrutinize the defendant's statements varied with the plaintiff's level
of business sophistication. The court recognized that in light of Hoch-
felder, the validity of the due care requirement as it applied to inten-
tional misconduct cases was being openly challenged,72 but in
McLean the defendant's conduct was reckless, not intentional, thus
the court concluded that there is "a wide spectrum of prohibited
behavior between negligence and specific intent to defraud. In that
uncharted land of knowing and reckless misconduct, defendant should
be entitled to contest liability by asserting a due diligence defense. "3
The defense failed in McLean because the court concluded that the
plaintiff could justifiably rely on the corporate records without having
to verify an independent financial audit. This analysis is incorrect.
Once justifiable reliance is established, the obligation of due care is
extinguished. Therefore, it can be said that the due care requirement
has been eliminated since one may justifiably rely on a reckless
statement and still be negligent.
In a subsequent case, Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.74
the plaintiff established at trial that certain defendants had either
deliberately or recklessly misrepresented the earnings record of a
corporation and thereby induced the plaintiff to enter into a stock
option transfer agreement. In considering the liability of the defend-
ants, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the defendants' reckless
conduct was within the boundaries of the scienter requirement an-
nounced in Hochfelder. The court summarily rejected the defendants'
argument that the plaintiff had failed to exercise due care, determining
that such a defense was not available. While the court stated that the
due care defense could not be raised "in an intentional fraud case, '" 75
since the decision's alternative basis was reckless conduct on the part
of the defendants, the court seems to suggest that the due care require-
ment is similarly inapplicable in the latter context. The plaintiff had
only to prove materiality and reliance to establish a causal connection
between the misrepresentation and its injury in order to recover. 76
71. Id. at 1078.
72. Id. (citing Straub v. Vaisman, 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976)).
73. Id.
74. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
75. Id. at 1040.
76. Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977), is the only decision since
Hochfelder that has suggested that the due care requirement has continuing vitality.
However, because the case did not involve an intentional or reckless violation of rule
lOb-5, its impact should be limited. In Hirsch, purchasers of partnership interests sued
the New York Stock Exchange and an accounting firm claiming that they had failed to
disclose financial information concerning a brokerage firm in which the plaintiffs had
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What can be said, therefore, about the plaintiff's due care require-
ment since Hochfelder, is that although the courts are generally unwil-
ling to repudiate the due care requirement entirely, they have not
required private plaintiffs to establish due care to recover in actions
under rule 10b-5. Those courts nominally retaining the due care
requirement are applying it in a manner that suggests it is becoming
synonymous with justifiable reliance. This creates a potential analyt-
ical problem.
1-. STATUTORY ANALYSIS AND THE DUE CARE REQUIREMENT
A. The Common Law Tort Analogy to Private Actions
Under Rule 10b-5
The Supreme Court pointed out in SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc. 7 7 that under the securities laws78 the principles of
common law actions for fraud and deceit should not be applied
" 'technically' as [they had] traditionally been applied in damage suits
between parties to arm's-length transactions involving land and ordi-
nary chattles" but rather " 'remedially' as the courts had adapted
[them] to the prevention of fraudulent securities transactions by
fiduciaries. ' 79 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the
invested. The Second Circuit found that neither defendant owed the plaintiffs a duty to
disclose that the brokerage firm once had a capital deficiency which it cured by selling
long-term securities. In dicta, the court indicated that the plaintiffs, because of their
status as sophisticated investors and their access to financial information, should have
made a more thorough investigation of the firm's financial structure. The court handled
the due care requirement in a cursory fashion. Moreover, the court intimated that the
plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the financial information. Therefore, the opinion is
not especially compelling concerning the due care requirement in the context of inten-
tional fraud.
77. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
78. 54 Stat. 582, as amended by 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970). Although Capital Gains
was an action brought under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the reasoning applies
equally well to lOb-5 actions because the 1940 act contains clauses (a) and (c) of rule
lOb-5.
79. 375 U.S. at 194-95. For the proposition that rule lob-5 is broader than common
law tort actions, see Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 1970) ("Together the
section and the rule aim at reaching 'misleading or deceptive activities, whether or not
they are precisely and technically sufficient to sustain a common law action for fraud
and deceit.' ") (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)); Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963). Professor Bromberg has stated:
[E]lements like scienter, (including both knowledge of falsity and intent to
deceive), justifiable reliance, and causation have been difficult for plaintiffs in
securities cases [under the common law]. And nondisclosure cases have rarely
been actionable.
When it turned its attention to securities legislation, Congress plainly ex-
pressed its wish that injured investors have an easier time. . . .[Therefore,
rule] lOb-5 and the other federal fraud provisions are not limited to common-
law fraud.
I A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD SEC RULE lOb-5 § 2.7(l) (1977).
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common law actions of fraud and deceit, as they had developed around
transactions involving land and tangible personalty, were "ill-suited to
the sale of such intangibles as. . .securities." 80 Nevertheless, courts
have drawn analogies to common law and equitable fraud theories for
the purpose of delineating the scope of rule lOb-5. For instance, the
Supreme Court in Hochfelder construed the words "manipulative,"
"deceptive, .... device" and "contrivance" as requiring a showing of
scienter on the part of the defendant in a private action under rule
10b-5.81 Scienter is an element of an action for intentional misrepre-
sentation or deceit at common law. 82 The precedent value of common
law principles in rule lOb-5 private actions is also evident in both the
Straub83 and Holdsworth84 opinions.
Because the courts have relied heavily on common law principles
to shape the boundaries of rule lOb-5, they should be helpful in
evaluating the viability of the due care requirement where the defend-
ant has intentionally violated the rule. The American Law Institute,
when it revised the Restatement of Torts, came out resolutely against
imposing a due care requirement on the plaintiff. 85 It rejected a pro-
80. 375 U.S. at 194.
81. 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
82. According to the late Dean Prosser, the elements of an action at law for deceit
are:
1. A false representation made by the defendant ...
2. Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is
false-or, what is regarded as equivalent, that he has not a sufficient basis
of information to make it. This element is given the technical name of
"scienter."
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from action in
reliance upon the misrepresentation.
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff, in
taking action or refraining from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
83. 540 F.2d at 597 ("Although not determinative, the common law torts of misre-
presentation and deceit are relevant in interpreting Rule l0b-5.").
84. 545 F.2d at 693-94 ("The analogizing to tort law in fashioning standards for
lOb-5 is instructive and useful."). Accord, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975). See also Note, The Nature and Scope of the Reliance Requirement in
Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 363, 366-70 (1973);
Note, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 824, 828-33
(1965).
85. The ALI decided to adhere to the existing Restatement, subject to editorial
changes. See 42 ALI PROCEEDINGS 331 (1965). The Restatement provides: "[T]he reci-
pient in a business transaction of a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact is justified in
relying upon its truth, although he might have ascertained the falsity of the representa-
tion had he made an investigation." RESTATEmENT OF TORTS § 540 (1938).
Comment a to § 540 contains a factual example which departs from the position of a
number of courts by tying due care to the plaintiff's access to material information or
constructive knowledge. A defendant who misrepresented his financial condition cannot
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posed revision which would have barred a plaintiff from recovery in a
deceit action if "he knows or has reason to know of facts which make
his reliance unreasonable. "86 The Institute refused to hold the victim
of an intentional deceit to the standard of a reasonable man of ordinary
prudence and thereby allow the defrauder to escape liability. They
rejected the revision because it amounted to allowing a contributory
negligence defense to an intentional tort.87 The drafters of the new
Contracts Restatement adopted the position of the Restatement Second
of Torts concerning the due care requirement 88 where the plaintiff is
bringing an action for avoidance or reformation of a contract. 89
Moreover, the rules apply to innocent as well as to fraudulent misre-
presentations. 90 If these common law principles are to be applied
remedially and flexibly, an imposition of a duty of inquiry should not
be imposed in an action under rule lOb-5, particularly where there has
been an intentional violation.
defend on the ground that he offered his victim an opportunity to inspect his books and
the offer was refused. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 540, Comment a (1938).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965). Note that
this standard would only protect a plaintiff who is negligent in failing to discover the
misrepresentation or omission. Where the plaintiff is misled by a patent falsity, he will
still be denied recovery under common law principles. See Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d
409, 115 P.2d 977 (1941); Bean v. Bickley, 187 Iowa 689, 174 N.W. 675 (1919); Ellis v.
Newbrough, 6 N.M. 181, 27 P. 490 (1891); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 341,
Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 541 (Tent.
Draft No. 10, 1964). The doctrine that a plaintiff may not rely on that which is so
preposterous as to defy credulity is followed by the federal courts in rule lOb-5 private
actions. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
87. 42 ALI PROCEEDINGS 322-31 (1965). According to Dean Prosser, the reporter in
favor of the revision, the change did not even require due care. Rather, in those few
cases where "red flags" appear, reliance would not be reasonable.
88. The drafters address due care in two chapters in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS; the two formulations vary little. In Mistake, the mistaken party to a contract
will not be barred from recovery "unless his fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith
and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 299 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1975). In Duress and Undue Influence, a
recipient's failure to investigate will not make his reliance unjustified unless he failed
under the same good faith standard described above. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 314 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1976).
89. For actions of avoidance and reformation in mistake cases, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 294, 295, 297 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1975). For their misrepre-
sentation counterparts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 306, 308 (Tent.
Draft No. 11, 1976).
90. The actions of avoidance and reformation evolved from the equitable remedy of
rescission which the Chancery Courts developed in response to the restrictive legal
action of deceit. The remedy of rescission could be based on innocent misrepresentation
whereas its legal counterpart required a showing of intent to defraud. W. PROSSER, supra
note 82. at 687.
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The due care requirement appears even less viable in light of the
major policy considerations underlying rule lOb-5. In Capital
Gains,91 the Supreme Court pointed out that a fundamental purpose,
common to all the federal securities laws, "was to substitute a philoso-
phy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.'"92
Thus, Congress required full and fair disclosure to the public to
insure that investors have the opportunity to make intelligent deci-
sions. The imposition of a due care requirement does not foster full
disclosure, nor does permitting a defendant to escape liability because
the plaintiff failed to exercise due care promote a high standard of
business ethics. This contradiction becomes more apparent when the
due care requirement is used, as a matter of equitable discretion, to
preclude recovery for victims of intentional misconduct. Mr. Wheeler
has argued that "the central principle of equity--equitable relief will
be denied when the plaintiff himself has not done equity-offers policy
support for denying recovery to a lOb-5 plaintiff who has failed to
exercise due care." 93 A few courts have adopted this reasoning, one
noting that equitable use of the due care requirement would "promote
statutory policies encouraging investor diligence in the interest of the
efficiency and stability of the securities market."94 This is a question-
able line of reasoning; a search of the legislative history of the Securi-
ties Act and the Exchange Act does not reveal a congressional concern
for deterring negligent conduct by investors. Rather, congressional
debate centered on promoting a fair securities market by providing
redress for fraudulent practices. 95
Another important factor undercuts the argument for imposing a
due care requirement on plaintiffs in lOb-5 actions. Rule lOb-5 is
aimed largely at deceptions by brokers96 and other "fiduciaries" who
take advantage of inside information. 97 The fiduciary relationship-be
91. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
92. Id. at 186.
93. Wheeler, supra note 3, at 584.
94. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir. 1977). Accord, Straub v. Vais-
man & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
95. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, 20-21 (1934).
96. See, e.g., Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices:
The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1281 (1965)
(special obligations of brokers); Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange Act Rule
lOb-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 869, 905 (1972) ("A broker's duty to
disclose arises out of the shingle theory, concepts of agency and Rule lOb-5's general
obligation to disclose.").
97. See Judge Leahy's opinion in Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D.
Del. 1951):
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
it between a broker, corporate officer, director, or principal stockhol-
der and an investor which rule lOb-5 seeks to protect-requires the
fiduciary to demonstrate a special degree of care for the beneficiary. At
common law the fiduciary is obligated not only to state information
truthfully, whether fact or opinion, 98 but also to disclose all material
facts to his beneficiary. 99 In addition, in situations where a fiduciary
relationship exists, common law fraud may be established without
proof of reliance or even a right to rely.100 Fraud may be established
even though the plaintiff lacked ordinary prudence. 101 Under the secu-
rities laws even these lenient elements have been relaxed. The Su-
preme Court has noted that "[it is not] necessary in a suit [under' the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940]102 against a fiduciary. . . to estab-
lish all the elements required in a suit against a party to an arm's length
transaction." 10 3 This principle should apply equally in transactions
arising under the Exchange Act. The fiduciary relationship of trust and
confidence between plaintiff and defendant was recognized as an
important factor in restricting the due care requirement in both
Holdsworth 14 and Straub. 105 Therefore, especially in cases involving
a relationship of trust or confidence or a fiduciary relationship-which
constitute the vast majority of rule lOb-5 civil litigation-the propriety
of the due care requirement is open to question.
B. Due Care and the Express Remedy Provisions of the
Federal Securities Laws
An analysis of the express civil remedies provided in the federal
It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to purchase the
stock of minority stockholders without disclosing material facts affecting the
value of the stock, known to the majority stockholder by virtue of his inside
position but not known to the selling minority stockholders, which information
would have affected the judgment of the sellers. The duty of disclosure stems
from the necessity of preventing a corporate insider from utilizing his position
to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders. . . .Some
courts have called this a fiduciary duty ....
Id. at 828-29 (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 153 Ore. 354,55 P.2d 1122(1936); Holcomb
& Hoke Mfg. Co. v. Auto Interurban Co., 140 Wash. 581, 250 P. 34 (1926); Poole v.
Camden, 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S.E. 454 (1916).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
100. See, e.g., Hassenpflug v. Jones, 84 Ariz. 33, 323 P.2d 296 (1958).
101. See, e.g., Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 183 F.2d 548 (4th
Cir. 1950). For a more detailed analysis of fiduciary relationships and common law
fraud, see 12 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1515B (1970); Keeton, Fraud--Concealment
and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1936).
102. 54 Stat. 852, as amended by 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970). See note 78 supra.
103. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
104. 545 F.2d at 696-97. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
105. 540 F.2d at 598 (knowing that plaintiff had confidence in its agent the defendant
brokerage firm abused that trust).
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securities laws also illustrates the impropriety of imposing a due care
requirement in intentional fraud cases under rule lOb-5. Eight sections
of the securities laws create or condition private remedies for miscon-
duct-ranging from negligent to intentional or reckless conduct. 106 In
these statutes, Congress narrowly defined the conduct which would
preclude a plaintiff's recovery. For example, section 12(2) of the
Securities Act, which imposes civil liability for a false or misleading
prospectus or oral communication (negligently or intentionally made),
bars recovery where the plaintiff purchaser knew of the untruth or
omission. 10 7 Section 9(e) of the Exchange Act, which prohibits inten-
tional manipulative conduct in connection with puts, calls, options or
straddles, makes no mention of a plaintiff's knowledge defense.108
Apparently Congress intended to surpass common law remedies by
allowing recovery even where the plaintiff had notice of the manipula-
tive conduct.
While most of these sections would bar a plaintiff who knows of
the untruth or omission (and some require a showing of reliance 1°9 or
damage causation in fact110), Congress never imposed a due care
burden on plaintiffs seeking recovery for intentional misconduct."1
Although private rights of action under rule lOb-5 are judicial crea-
tions, courts have looked to the express civil remedies to help deter-
mine the limits of relief in implied actions,1 12 and imposing a due care
burden in an implied civil remedy case runs contrary to the express
liability provisions of the securities laws.
IV. PLAINTIFF'S DUE CARE REQUIREMENT BEFORE HOCHFELDER
Prior to Hochfelder some courts established a due care require-
106. Securities Act §§ 11, 12, 13, 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77m, 77o (1970);
Exchange Act §§ 9, 16(b), 18, 20, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78p(b), 78r, 78t (1970).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 77! (1970). Accord, Securities Act § 1 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970)
(imposing civil liability for negligently or intentionally false or misleading registration
statements); Exchange Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970) (imposing liability for false or
misleading statements negligently or intentionally made and filed with the SEC).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970). Accord, United States v. Charney, [1975-76 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,560 (9th Cir.). But see Marsh v. Armada Corp.,
533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976).
109. See, e.g., Securities Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
110. See, e.g., Exchange Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
111. Defining the statute of limitations for actions under §§ 11 or 12(2) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1970), Congress created a "due diligence"
requirement. A plaintiff will be barred from recovery one year "after. . . discovery [of
the untrue statement or omission] should have been made by the exercise of reasonable
diligence. . . ."Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970). This due care requirement
in § 13 has no relation to the due care requirement which is the subject of this Note. The
former obligation is imposed on the plaintiff after the transaction, while the latter must
be exercised before the transaction.
112. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976).
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ment, apparently to counterbalance the plaintiff's relatively low bur-
den of proving negligent conduct or constructive knowledge on the
part of the defendant as a basis for recovery under rule 10b-5. 113 An
analysis of the pre-Hochfelder cases involving an intentional violation
of rule lOb-5 reveals that a failure to exercise due care has never
barred a plaintiff from relief. The cases in which the courts have
focused on the plaintiff's conduct are divided into three broad
categories. In the first series of cases the defendants were innocent of
violating rule lOb-5, in the second series the defendants had been
merely negligent in their actions, and in the third series the defendants
were guilty of intentional misconduct. It is only in the second series of
cases that the purported due care requirement may have had some
validity as a concept of contributory negligence, but the few cases
which purport to impose a due care requirement are actually based on
the principle that a plaintiff may not rely on that which he knows to be
untrue, or that which is patently false.1 14
A. Plaintiff's Due Care Obligation Where Defendant
Was Innocent of Wrongdoing
Many rule lOb-5 cases involve situations where the defendant has
established that he had reasonable grounds to believe the plaintiff had
knowledge of the undisclosed information. This negates the defend-
ant's obligation io disclose and absolves him of liability. Kohler v.
Kohler Co. 115 illustrates this defense. The plaintiff seller alleged that
insider-shareholders of the defendant corporation failed to disclose
details of a pension plan accounting method which reduced the book
value of the shares prior to their resale to the corporation. The Seventh
Circuit found that the choice of accounting procedures was a good faith
business decision. Moreover, the corporation was not obligated to
inform the plaintiff of the accounting method employed because the
plaintiff was an insider already on constructive and possibly actual
notice of the practice since he participated in a directors meeting where
113. Professor Bromberg has stated this rationale:
It is noteworthy that the [8th, 9th, and 10th] circuits which have most clearly
charged defendant with constructive knowledge or diligence are, by and large,
the same courts that have similarly charged plaintiff. There is a logic and a
balance in this. A high standard of conduct for defendant justifies a high
standard for plaintiff. Stated a little differently, the price plaintiff pays for
being relieved of the burden of proving defendant's intent or actual knowledge,
is that plaintiff himself must show some diligence.
2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 79, at § 8.4. The court in Holdsworth cited this statement
with approval. 545 F.2d at 692-93.
114. See text accompanying notes 128-41 infra.
115. 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
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the accounting procedures were discussed. The defendant's burden to
disclose was formulated as follows:
On the one hand, corporate insiders must scrupulously dis-
close to outsiders those material facts about a corporation's
business which in reasonable and objective contemplation
might affect the value of the corporation's stock. On the
other hand, they are not required to search out details that
presumably would not influence the person's judgment with
whom they are dealing." 6
Since the defendant in Kohler was not under a duty to disclose, it
could be argued that the plaintiff was obligated to investigate and his
failure to exercise due care precluded his recovery. However, this
reasoning is unsound because it does not conform to the proper analy-
sis of a lOb-5 private action. The plaintiff must first prove that the
defendant was under an obligation to disseminate accurate material
information. Only after a duty has been established will the courts
consider whether the plaintiff's conduct and reliance create the neces-
sary causal nexus. It was the plaintiff's failure to prove that the
defendant was obligated to inform him of the accounting procedures,
and not a failure to exercise due care, which precluded the plaintiff's
recovery.
The rule of reasonable information disclosure is not limited to
dealings between corporate insiders. For example, corporate outsiders
in Arber v. Essex Wire Corp. ,17 alleged that they had been fraudu-
lently induced by the president to sell their stock back to the defendant
corporation. The claimed omissions included nondisclosure of the
stock's book value which was substantially greater than the offering
price, and information concerning earnings per share. The court found
that the corporation was not under a duty to disclose this "routine"
data since it was contained in the books and the records of the
corporation which the plaintiffs knew to be readily available.118 On the
other hand, the court indicated that this conclusion would not result
where the information not disclosed is of an "unusual or extraordinary
nature." 1
19
116. Id. at 642.
117. 490 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1974).
118. Id. at 420. Accord, Hafner v. Forest Labs., Inc., 345 F.2d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 1965)
(Defendant insider not obligated to disclose where current price information "was
available to the public in the National Daily Quotation Sheets."). See also Johnson v.
Wiggs, 443 F.2d 803 (5th Cir, 1971); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 45, (E.D. Mo. 1976).
119. 490 F.2d at 420. Without explanation or analysis a few courts have explicitly
mentioned due care as a burden imposed upon the plaintiff in situations where the
defendant was not obligated to make disclosures. For example, in Financial Indus. Fund,
Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973), the purchaser claimed
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B. Negligent Misrepresentations and Omissions by the Defendant
In cases where the defendant's negligent misrepresentation or
omission has constituted an actionable violation of rule 10b-5, courts,
at times, have resorted to notions of due care to bar a plaintiff's
recovery. The use of due care as a form of contributory negligence in
actions based on negligent misrepresentation or omission is under-
standable. At common law, a plaintiff had to demonstrate objective,
reasonable reliance on a defendant's negligent misstatement in order to
recover in an action for deceit. 120 Thus, a few pre-Hochfelder deci-
sions indicated that where a reasonable man would have investigated a
defendant's negligent conduct and the plaintiff had failed to do so,
recovery should be denied.
The Second Circuit suggested this result in Frigitemp Corp. v.
Financial Dynamics Fund.121 The defendant mutual funds purchased
convertible debentures from a corporation in which the plaintiffs were
majority stockholders on the condition that the plaintiffs would con-
tribute 100,000 shares of common stock to the corporation. The
plaintiffs alleged that, at the time of the contribution, the defendants
were engaged in a scheme to use inside information provided by the
shareholders and to buy shares in such volume as to "artificially
increase the market price." ' 122 Moreover, the defendants failed to
disclose they were buying a large number of shares on the open
market prior to the debenture sale. The court required the plaintiffs to
establish an intent to defraud and concluded that the defendant mutual
funds had not knowingly manipulated the transaction. As to the omis-
sion, the court found that the funds were under no duty to disclose the
market transactions because the shareholders had transfer sheets in
that the defendant corporation had made a material omission by delaying the release of a
special earnings statement. The court concluded the corporation was not obligated to
disclose the earnings statement until sufficient information was available for an accurate
release, and continued: "We have expressed the requirement that the plaintiff must also
exercise good faith in its purchase, due diligence, and demonstrate reliance on the acts or
inaction of the defendant." Id. at 517 (emphasis added). The court failed to explain the
relevance of due diligence to the specific facts of the case. Similarly, in Vohs v. Dickson,
495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974), the court found that the defendant was not obligated to
disclose certain financial matters about a corporation whose stock plaintiffs had pur-
chased because the defendant had no knowledge of the information. The court then
added that the "[p]laintiffs, too, were charged with a duty of reasonable investigation"
which they satisfied by obtaining the company's annual report and discussing the
transaction with one of the corporate officers. Id. at 623. Language concerning the due
care requirements is dicta since the defendants had not violated any duty to disclose.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(A) (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
121. 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975).
122. Id. at 281.
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their possession showing the prior purchases. In dicta, the court noted
that "even if we lower the requirement of scienter on the part of the
defendant . . . his reasonable knowledge that the other party already
had access to the facts should excuse him from new disclosures which
reasonably appear to him repetitive." 123 Although not binding, the
dicta in Frigitemp Corp. is instructive as to the role of due care in
negligent misconduct cases before Hochfelder. The defendant may be
negligent in believing that the plaintiff has access to material informa-
tion. In other words, an objective reasonable man would have believed
that disclosure was inadequate. The opinion also suggests that some
quantum of due care must be exercised by the plaintiff; a plaintiff who
fails to investigate may be precluded from recovery by contributory
negligence where the defendant is merely negligent.
In City National Bank v. Vanderboom,124 investors counter-
claimed that an officer of the plaintiff bank had misrepresented the
financial condition of the corporations in which they were interested
and thus induced them to borrow money from the bank to purchase
shares of the corporations. The district court established that because
the officer's misrepresentation could not be imputed to the bank, the
bank did not have knowledge of the alleged fraud, and that the bank
acted in good faith in making the loans. Since the bank did not sell or
offer to sell any security, the district court concluded that the investors
lacked standing to sue under the "purchaser-seller" standing require-
ment of rule 1Ob-5.125 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court on
the standing issue and added in dicta that the alleged negligent misrep-
resentations and nondisclosures by the bank were not covered by rule
lOb-5. The investors claimed that the bank's president had silently
acquiesced to the misrepresentations made by the other officer, and
had advised them that the corporations were good investments even
though the bank knew otherwise because of an independent audit of
one of the corporations. The court found that the investors had access
to the audit which was made for the corporation and not the bank.
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that an objective reasonable
investor, exercising due care, would not have relied on the president's
representations. 126 By requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that he
123. Id. at 282.
124. 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
125. Id. at 227.
126. Id. at 231. The court formulated the standard for actionable misrepresentations
and omissions as follows:
With regard to misrepresentations, the question is whether a reasonable inves-
tor, in light of the facts existing at the time of the misrepresentation and in
exercise of due care, would have been entitled to rely upon the misrepresenta-
tion. With regard to nondisclosures, the issue becomes whether a reasonable
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exercised due care, the court balanced the bank's negligent conduct
against the contributory negligence of the investors in failing to inves-
tigate the corporation's financial stability. In spite of the fact that
Vanderboom has been cited for the proposition that a plaintiff has a
due care obligation even where the defendant's misconduct was inten-
tional,127 the opinion suggests that it should be limited to situations in
which the defendant was negligent. The result in Vanderboom might
very well have been different if the bank officer had intentionally
misrepresented the financial condition of the corporations.
C. The Due Care Requirement in Intentional Fraud Situations
While the due care requirement has found some acceptance among
the courts in the pre-Hochfelder negligence cases, where it can be
analogized to contributory negligence, its application to intentional
fraud cases is suspect. The following cases demonstrate that once an
intentional violation of rule lOb-5 has been established, the imposition
of a due care requirement was more the result of judicial confusion
than careful legal analysis.
1. Cases Purporting to Require Due Care
The Eighth Circuit in Myzel v. Fields12 8 was the first court to
ostensibly impose a due care burden on the plaintiff where the defend-
ant intentionally violated rule lOb-5. Four plaintiffs were induced to
sell their stock to the defendant by intentional misstatenents and
omissions including nondisclosure of a monthly financial statement
showing a substantial profit. The defendant was a close friend of the
plaintiffs and served as their financial adviser. The court had no
difficulty permitting the three plaintiffs, who were outsiders of the
corporation, to recover. The fourth plaintiff was sophisticated in finan-
cial matters and a member of the board of directors; the court noted
that his reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations about the
company's value taxed "even the most credulous of minds."' 29 This
plaintiff "was in a position to investigate or to make an effort to inform
himself as to the corporate values." 130 He was on notice of facts which
investor, in light of the facts existing at the time of the nondisclosure and in
exercise of due care, would have been entitled to receive full disclosure...
and would have acted differently had the alleged nondisclosure not occurred.
Id. at 230 (emphasis added). Accord, Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp.
1200 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
127. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 1974); Clement A.
Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988
(1971).
128. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
129. Id. at 736.
130. Id.
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would have been disclosed in the corporate books and at directors
meetings. However, the court found other misrepresentations on which
the fourth plaintiff could justifiably rely. The defendant's brother had
informed the plaintiff that the defendant was "going to get out" of the
company because the corporation was on the verge of bankruptcy.131
The plaintiff then sold his stock to the brother who subsequently
transferred it to the defendant. At no time did the brother reveal that he
was making the transaction for the defendant.
The Eighth Circuit found that the jury could have reasonably
inferred that the result of this artifice was to keep the plaintiff from
investigating the value of the stock. The court concluded that because
of the relationship of trust between the plaintiff and the defendant, and
the fact that the brother did not disclose that he was working for the
defendant, the plaintiff's reliance was justifiable. 132 While the court
seemed to require that a plaintiff exercise due care for his own protec-
tion, in actuality, it did not go that far. Rather, the court implied that
the due care obligation will be imposed upon a reckless plaintiff. 133
The fact that a plaintiff was reckless, however, would only negate his
justifiable reliance. Recovery would be denied, not because the reck-
less plaintiff failed to exercise due care, but because he failed to
establish justifiable reliance.
Another case which has been cited for the proposition that due care
is a requirement in intentional misconduct cases is Mitchell v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co. 134 The defendant corporation in Mitchell intention-
ally issued a misleading press release concerning mining exploration.
Four days later, the company widely circulated a corrective release.
The court allowed recovery for three plaintiffs who sold their stock in
reliance on the first release and prior to the publication of the second
release. However, recovery was denied to another plaintiff who had
sold his shares six or seven days after the corrective release was issued.
The district court reasoned that at some point after publication of the
curative release the plaintiff could no longer claim reliance on the
original misleading statement. A contrary result would encourage a
stockholder to speculate after publication of the deceptive release,
suing only if he took a loss. The court noted that there is a "require-
ment that stockholders. . . act in good faith and with due diligence in
purchasing and selling stock.' 135 While the court spoke in terms of
131. Id. at 737.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 736.
134. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
135. Id. at 103.
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due diligence, it did not establish a duty of independent investigation.
Rather, the case turned on whether, by the time the plaintiff sold his
stock, the reasonable investor would have had knowledge of the
corrective release. 136 Thus, the Mitchell court employed an objective
reasonable reliance test on the due care issue. The widely publicized
corrective release was a "red flag" which cut off justifiable reliance.
Undoubtedly the court confused the term due diligence with justifiable
reliance. Justifiable reliance does not require affirmative action, but an
investor cannot be blind to the world and still claim his reliance was
justifiable.
In Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 137 the Fifth Circuit
purported to recognize due care as a separate element, distinct from
reliance, in a rule 10b-5 action. In Evans, the plaintiff brokerage firm
sued the defendant brokerage firm alleging that it devised and partici-
pated in a scheme designed to create a facade of financial responsibili-
ty for its agent. The plaintiff claimed that because of this misrepresen-
tation it executed trades for the agent and permitted the agent to
continue trading even during a three to four month period in which five
of his checks were dishonored for insufficient funds. The plaintiff firm
eventually took heavy losses on the dishonored checks. This occurred
even though Federal Reserve Board Regulation T required that the
plaintiff firm freeze the agent's account when the checks failed. 138 The
court's opinion addressed two issues, reliance and due care. The Fifth
Circuit found that the plaintiff's reliance was unjustifiable. The dis-
honored checks and the freeze requirement were unique circumstances
which should have alerted the plaintiff that actual reliance was insuffi-
cient. 13 9 Regarding due care, the Fifth Circuit adopted the standard
articulated by the district court: "[T]he plaintiff's sophistication, ex-
pertise and business acumen in the financial community, his access to
information and opportunity to detect fraud are all relevant considera-
tions in determining the exercise of reasonable diligence."' 14 Al-
though it recognized that this approach had previously been used only
in cases where the defendant had negligently misrepresented material
information, the court accepted a negligence standard of due care.141
136. Id.
137. 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
138. 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(8) (1977).
139. 434 F.2d at 104.
140. Id.
141. The McAlpine court quoted with approval the test employed in Vanderboom:
"With regard to misrepresentations, the question is whether a reasonable investor, in
light of the facts existing at the time of the misrepresentation and in exercise of due care,
would have been entitled to rely upon the misrepresentation." Id. at 103 (emphasis
original).
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However, the court's broad pronouncement must be read in light of the
unique facts of this case. The plaintiff acted recklessly in the face of a
patently false representation. Hence, his reckless conduct showed a
lack of justifiable reliance. The decision was not actually based on a
failure to exercise due care.
The impropriety of the due care requirement in intentional viola-
tion cases was recognized later by the Fifth Circuit in Bird v. Ferry.142
Members of an investment club brought an action against a broker who
had employed their financial adviser alleging that the adviser had
perpetrated a fraud and used the club's funds for personal speculation.
The defendant contended that the plaintiffs, by not reviewing the
confirmations and receipts of their transactions, had failed to exercise
due care and therefore should be denied recovery under Evans. The
Fifth Circuit found that the adviser was a quasi-fiduciary and affirmed
the district court's finding that the plaintiff had exercised due care.
Once the plaintiffs had established justifiable reliance, the court did
not require independent verification or affirmative action by the plain-
tiffs to show due care. Consequently, it would be possible for a
plaintiff to act negligently and still justifiably rely, a result which puts
the purported due care requirement as articulated by Evans in doubt.
2. Cases Rejecting the Due Care Requirement in Intentional
Fraud Situations
As discussed above, a number of courts have spoken of due care
when denying recovery to plaintiffs who have shown a marked indif-
ference to an obvious fraud. Nevertheless, these courts did not set up
an affirmative duty of due care. The generally accepted view is that an
intentional violation of rule lOb-5 should result in recovery for the
victim regardless of whether or not the plaintiff exercised due care.
In Carrol v. First National Bank, 143 the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant bank had participated in the creation of a "credit bubble" to
peg the market in certain securities. The bank raised the affirmative
defense of due care, claiming that the plaintiffs had been negligent in
selling the securities. The court rejected this argument, finding that
contributory negligence was a defense to negligence but not fraud.144
As such, Carrol constitutes a rejection of the due care requirement in
intentional fraud cases.
Carrol is consistent with the conclusions reached by the Tenth
Circuit in Gilbert v. Nixon. 145 There the court found that the defendant
142. 497 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1974).
143. 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
144. Id. at 358.
145. 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970).
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had deliberately misrepresented the commercial feasibility of an oil
well, but remanded the case for a determination of whether the plain-
tiffs had actual knowledge of the falsity of the misleading state-
ments. 146 The court of appeals instructed the lower court that, "[i]n
making such a determination the district court should keep in mind that
[the plaintiffs] cannot be charged with the obligation to make indepen-
dent investigations to verify the accuracy of [the defendant's] represen-
tations. "147
The Fifth Circuit, in Stier v. Smith,148 concluded that even a
sophisticated investor is not required to make an independent verifica-
tion to protect himself. Plaintiff Stier was induced by intentional
omissions to purchase stock in a franchise operation. While the court
of appeals agreed with the district court's conclusion that the plaintiff
had adequate access to the information necessary to detect the impro-
priety, it reasoned that "sophisticated investors, like all others are
entitled to the truth." ' 149 Accordingly, the court reversed the district
court decision, stating:
We should always be wary of holding that a purchaser of
securities, who deals with the corporate insider, could have
found out omitted material facts by examining the corporate
books . . . To do so is to allow the insider to present
prospective purchasers with a mountain of information
which they cannot possibly digest and excuse themselves
from liability on the basis that they did not provide the right
answers because they were not asked the right questions.
"Readiness and willingness to disclose are not equivalent to
disclosure." 150
These decisions establish that, prior to Hochfelder, the plaintiff
was not under an affirmative duty to investigate and detect the defend-
ant's intentional fraud. Due care or due diligence arose only where the
fraud was patently false and justifiable reliance could not be shown.
Thus, due care was not recognized as an affirmative duty before or
after the Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder.
V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE DUE CARE REQUIREMENT
Following the stock market crash of 1929, there was a growing
awareness among government officials, business leaders, and the pub-
146. Id. at 363. Even at common law, actual knowledge of an intentional misrepre-
sentation would bar plaintiff's recovery. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 541
(Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
147. 429 F.2d at 361.
148. 473 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1973).
149. Id. at 1207.
150. Id. at 1208 (citation omitted).
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lic that widespread abuses in the securities markets had to be elimi-
nated in order to avert another economic debacle. This sentiment
provided the political impetus for passage of the Securities Act 151 and
the Exchange Act. 152 In section 2 of the Exchange Act Congress noted
that inadequate disclosure of corporate financial affairs had created
conditions conducive to manipulation and control of security prices
and misdirected speculation. This in turn caused a misallocation of
resources in the capital markets and in the nation's economy as a
whole. 153 To protect investors 154 and to promote rational and informed
investment decisions, Congress created a system regulating disclosure
of financial information to the investing public, 155 supported by anti-
fraud provisions. 156 Government regulation also seeks to divest de-
frauders of their ill-gotten gains and return the funds to their victims.
The stated policy of assuring information dissemination, in order to
promote the social goal of intelligent investor decisionmaking, is
readily susceptible to economic analysis. The purpose of the discus-
sion herein is not to determine whether the social goal of disclosure
constitutes an efficient social policy in the macroeconomic sense. 157
Congress has determined that protection of the investor is a desirable
social goal. However, the provisions for investor protection-regula-
tion of the securities markets and over-the-counter trading-have a
cost connected to them, and the money spent by the government and
the private sector to effectuate this social goal should be minimized.
151. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933).
152. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934). For an historical analysis of
the events and circumstances culminating in the enactment of the federal securities laws,
see generally R. DEBEDTS, THE NEW DEAL'S SEC (1964).
153. Exchange Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
154. The goal of the securities laws is to protect investors from fraud in the securities
markets. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (The Exchange Act
"was intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices").
155. In general, § 2 of the Exchange Act and Title I of the Securities Act structure
disclosure.
As the Supreme Court recently noted in Hochfelder, the Exchange Act "was intend-
ed principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through regula-
tion of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to
impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national
securities exchanges." 425 U.S. at 195.
156. In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974), the Second Circuit pointed out: "The purpose behind Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 is to protect the investing public and to secure fair dealing in the securities markets
by promoting full disclosure of inside information so that an informed judgment can be
made by all investors who trade in such markets." Id. at 235.
157. For a discussion attacking the disclosure provisions as macroeconomically inef-
ficient, see Demsetz, Perfect Competition, Regulation, and the Stock Market, in
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 1-22 (H. Manne ed.
1969).
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Therefore, this discussion is concerned with the microeconomic
ramifications of information failures,158 be they misrepresentations,
half-truths, or omissions, where the information failures are caused by
intentional misconduct or inaction on the part of the party responsible
for information dissemination.
A. Economics of the Due Care Requirement in
Investor Decisionmaking
An intentional information failure coupled with a due care require-
ment conflicts with the two fundamental congressional objectives
underlying securities disclosure regulation: (1) to avoid involuntary
wealth redistribution159 and (2) to keep the cost of protection as low as
possible without compromising its effectiveness. When a potential
investor lacks material information he cannot make an optimally intel-
ligent investment decision. If the investor, unaware of the information
failure, consummates the transaction, he will involuntarily transfer
wealth to the defrauder, either by paying an inflated price for the stock
or by selling the stock for less than its real value. The difference
between the price paid and the real value is a loss to the ignorant
investor, and a gain to the party who intentionally caused the informa-
tion failure; resources have moved away from the protected investor
and towards the defrauder. The investor should respond to his loss by
instituting a rule lOb-5 private action to recover the defendant's
fraudulent gain. However, a due care requirement would prevent many
plaintiff investors from recovering, and subject them to involuntary
wealth redistribution, thus conflicting with the wealth distribution
criteria of society.
Second, an intentional information failure increases the cost of
investor protection. Once information has been produced, the cost of
dissemination is marginal. 160 If the plaintiff is required to exercise due
care in an intentional violation situation, he will be expending extra
resources to verify information already available. Because the cost of
independent verification is greater than the cost of disseminating exist-
ing information, the aggregate cost of investor protection rises. The
158. "Information failure" is a term used by Ronald J. Coffey, in his discussion of
the economic effects of information failures on the securities market, to cover both
omittive and assertive preventable information failures. Securities Regulation Policy &
Analysis (1977) (unpublished multilith, Case Western Reserve Law School).
159. We refer here to haphazard, unexpected wealth redistribution between individu-
als as opposed to controlled involuntary wealth redistribution through formal govern-
mental systems (through taxes and expenditures).
160. See Professor Rooney's comments on the paper presented by Professor Dem-
setz in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES, supra note
157, at 109.
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due care requirement thus works at cross purposes to Congress' intent
to foster the least cost-preventive method of information disclosure.
B. Economics of the Due Care Requirement in a
Fiduciary Relationship
The due care requirement creates even more economic inefficien-
cies when the party who intentionally causes the information failure is
a fiduciary of the investor. As pointed out above, 161 rule lOb-5 is
aimed primarily at deceptions by brokers and others who take advan-
tage of inside information. The fiduciary relationship implies an
economic norm: that the fiduciary will act in the economic best interest
of his beneficiary. When the fiduciary intentionally causes an informa-
tion failure, he is working in opposition to this economic norm. Rule
lOb-5 seeks to remedy this breach of trust by causing the fiduciary to
return his ill-gotten gains to his beneficiary. The due care requirement
pulls in the opposite direction, forcing the beneficiary to expend more
resources to monitor his fiduciary and increasing the cost of the trust
relationship. This is a clear example of economic waste produced by
the due care requirement. 162
VI. DuE CARE AND THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF
RULE lOb-5 PRiVATE ACTIONS
In addition to compensating harmed investors, rule lOb-5 civil
remedies also provide "a necessary supplement to [SEC] action." 163
Congress intended the express liability provisions of the Securities
Act 64 to have a compensatory and, more importantly, an "in ter-
rorem" effect. 165 By allowing compensatory relief for a plaintiff under
161. See notes 96-99 supra and accompanying text.
162. It may be appropriate to do away with the due care requirement even where the
fiduciary negligently causes information failure. Involuntary wealth redistribution
caused by information failure is even more reprehensible if caused by a fiduciary than
when it occurs in an arms' length transaction. When we require the fiduciary to avoid
information failures vis h vis the beneficiary, we are honoring, at the least, an implied
agreement between the parties. The fiduciary has consented to act in the best interests of
his beneficiary. The plaintiff beneficiary in turn, relying on this' special arrangement,
reposes his trust and confidence in the fiduciary: he trusts the fiduciary to inform him of
all material information relating to the trust. The beneficiary is thus diverted from taking
steps to avert information failure. The due care requirement, imposing an affirmative
obligation on the plaintiff beneficiary to monitor the fiduciary, is thus even more incon-
sistent in a setting which discourages such vigilance than it is in the context of an arm's
length transaction.
163. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (quoting 1.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (a case arising under § 12 of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970))).
164. Securities Act §§ 11, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1970).
165. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
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rule lOb-5 courts create a deterrent effect by making violations unprof-
itable for the defendant.
Imposing a due care requirement on the plaintiff in a rule lOb-5
action undercuts this deterrent effect because fewer violators are forced
to return their fraudulent gains. A due care requirement might even
encourage intentional wrongdoing since potential defrauders may find
it profitable to perpetrate securities fraud, realizing that mere negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff will allow them to retain the fruits of
the fraudulent transaction. It can be argued, however, that the doc-
trines of compensation and deterrence operate independently of one
another. 166 A plaintiff's recovery might be barred because he failed to
exercise due care, while the defendant who committed the intentional
violation would, nevertheless, be subject to discipline. 167 Unfortunate-
ly the SEC is simply not able to investigate and punish every violation
of the securities laws. The Fifth Circuit was aware of this limitation
when it noted: "The [SEC] has neither the manpower nor the time that
complete effective enforcement of the securities laws by it alone would
require.' ' 168 Therefore, private actions under rule lOb-5 are essential
deterrents, necessary to effective enforcement of the federal securities
laws and they should not be compromised by the imposition of a due
care requirement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The imposition of a due care requirement upon plaintiffs may have
been appropriate in factual situations where the defendant had negli-
gently violated rule 1Ob-5. Where both the plaintiff and the defendant
were negligent, it did not seem unreasonable to bar the plaintiff from
recovery. However, now that implied private actions under rule lOb-5
are limited to situations where the defendant is guilty of intentional
misconduct, this contributory negligence rationale is no longer appli-
cable. This is consistent with the common law principle that contribu-
tory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort where only
subjective, actual reliance must be proven.
An analysis of the express liability provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws reveals that Congress did not intend that investors undertake
an independent verification to detect an intentional fraud. The due care
requirement contradicts the policy of investor protection which under-
lies the federal securities laws by allowing a defrauder to keep his ill-
166. See Wheeler, supra note 3, at 786.
167. The SEC can sue to enjoin violations of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 and also invoke
criminal remedies. See Exchange Act §§ 21, 32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u, 78ff (1970).
168. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804_(5th Cir. 1970).
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gotten gains, thereby penalizing the investor. It also undermines the
integrity of the fiduciary relationships on which an investor relies in
securities transactions by requiring a plaintiff to monitor the conduct of
his fiduciary. Finally, the due care requirement negates the informa-
tion disclosure philosophy which Congress adopted in the securities
laws; it forces an investor to expend resources discovering existing
information thus causing economic waste. Accordingly, it is appropri-
ate that a number of federal courts of appeals have, in effect, recently
laid to rest suggestions that there should be a plaintiff's due care
requirement in cases where the defendant has intentionally violated
rule lOb-5.
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